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The Uniform Product Liability Act-A
Brief Overview*
Victor E. Schwartz**
I deeply appreciate the invitation of the Vanderbilt Law Review
to participate in a Symposium honoring my colleague, Dean John
W. Wade. I am serving as a federal official and writing about a topic
developed by the federal government. As readers of this periodical
can appreciate, that puts an author-especially a law review au-
thor-under special constraints. His or her view, no matter how
carefully caveated or "asterisked," may be read as reflecting official
policy; and, for better or worse, official policy does not have the
subtle nuances that are found in many law review articles. Never-
theless, the editors of the Vanderbilt Law Review suggested that I
provide an overview of the Department of Commerce's new Uniform
Product Liability Act (Uniform Act).' In deference to their judg-
ment and the general interest the Act has provoked, I have complied
with their suggestion.
I. THE PRODUCT LIABUTY PROBLEM-BACKGROUND
In 1975, business writers and manufacturers took steps to con-
front what they saw as a serious problem (some sources said
"crisis") in the product liability field. They alleged that product
liability insurance had become unavailable or unaffordable. The
consequences of this situation included the possibilities that busi-
nesses might terminate because they were unable to get coverage,
that injured persons would be unable to enforce their product
liability judgments, and that manufacturers would hesitate to
produce some products that would be useful in our society-
pharmaceuticals, for example. In general, it was alleged that the
system of private insurance in the field of product liability was
breaking down.
* The official views of the Department of Commerce in regard to the Uniform Product
Liability Act (UPLA) have been set forth in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714-50 (1979). Any views ex-
pressed herein inconsistent with those documents are solely those of the author.
** Chairman, Department of Commerce Task Force on Product Liability and Accident
Compensation. Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. A.B., Boston University, 1962;
LL.B., Columbia University, 1965. Professor Schwartz chaired the Working Task Force of the
Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liability. The author gratefully acknowledges the
assistance of Mr. Jonathan S. Flom in researching this Article and Ms. Nancy G. Lewis in
editing.
1. UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as U.P.L.A.].
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In April 1976, a Federal Interagency Task Force on Product
Liability was established by the Economic Policy Board of the
White House to study the product liability problem and report back
to the Policy Board on or before December 15 of that year. The
Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liability Briefing
Report2 was released to the public on January 4, 1977. The Briefing
Report was a highly condensed "still picture" of the product liabil-
ity problem as it existed in December 1976. It was based on prelimi-
nary drafts of three independent studies commissioned by the Task
Force as well as pre-December 1, 1976 data and information. When
the Carter Administration took office, it requested the Task Force
to edit and publish these reports, a task which was completed in the
spring of 1977. 3 The Administration also asked the Task Force to
prepare a Final Report that would give citizens as well as policy-
makers an in-depth view of the product liability problem and its
consequences. That report was published in November 1977.'
Among other things, the Task Force reported a substantial.in-
crease in the cost of product liability insurance since 1974. The
increase appeared to have been greater for small, as compared to
large, businesses. Product liability concerns had deterred the intro-
duction of new products, but problems in the product liability area
had not, by themselves, caused actual business failures. On the
other hand, circumstantial evidence suggested that substantial
product liability premium increases may have been one of several
factors that caused small businesses in high risk product industries
to go out of business. The Final Report concluded that some sources
had grossly exaggerated the number of product liability claims. For
example, the Insurance Information Institute had reported that
there were "a million claims" filed in 1976. 5 After an actual closed
claim survey was conducted, insurance industry sources reduced the
estimate to between sixty and seventy thousand claims.6
2. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LmAmImrry BRIEFING REPORT (1977). This and
other Task Force Reports, see notes 3 and 4 infra, are available from the National Technical
Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161 (Attention: Sales Desk). The accession num-
ber is PB 262 515. The price is $4.50. Checks should be enclosed and made payable to NTIS.
3. For general information on obtaining reports see note 2 supra. The details of the 1977
reports are as follows: LEGAL STuny (The Research Group, Inc. 1977) (Accession No. PB 263
601, $31.25); INDusTRY STUDY (Gordon Associates, Inc. 1977) (Accession No. PB 265 542,
$21.25); INSURANCE STUDY (McKinsey, Inc. 1977) (Accession No. PB 263 600, $9.00).
4. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT Lur~nrY FINAL REPORT (1977) (Accession No.
PB 272 220, $20.00) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
5. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTmrrE, INSURANCE FACTS 1976, at 8.
6. Product Liability Insurance Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Capital, Investment
and Business Opportunities of the House Comm. on Small Business, Part 2, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 547 (1977) (statement of Mavis A. Walters).
[Vol. 33:579
UNIFORM ACT
The Task Force also found that in the overwhelming majority
of cases, insurance company sources did not rely on data to support
premium increases that occurred in the 1974-1976 period. While
circumstantial evidence suggested that some insurers engaged in
"panic pricing,"7 the Final Report concluded that insurance rate-
making practices alone were not the cause of the problem. Growing
uncertainties in tort law, especially the continued common-law cre-
ation of retroactive product liability rules, had created a major rate-
making problem for insurers. Even if insurers collected more exten-
sive claims data, continued uncertainty in product liability law
would, in turn, foster overly subjective ratemaking practices.,
The Task Force found that strict liability may have been less
"strict" than some sources alleged. On the other hand, it also found
that some appellate courts viewed product liability law not as a
means of apportioning responsibilities among parties but as a com-
pensation system. Some decisions came close to holding that the
tort litigation system should provide a recovery whenever a person
was injured by a product.' Although those cases appeared to be
relatively few in number, insurers regarded them as quite important
in their underwriting practices.
II. FROM STUDY TO LEGISLATIVE ACTION
The Task Force was not permitted to make specific legislative
recommendations. After the Final Report was published, however,
the Administration asked the Department of Commerce to prepare
an options paper regarding what, if any, federal action should be
taken to attack the product liability problem. That options paper,
published in the Federal Register in April 1978,10 contained both
long- and short-range measures" addressing the problem. In gen-
eral, the long-range measures were directed at the principal causes
of the problem-inadequate insurer ratemaking procedures, uncer-
tainties in the tort litigation system, and unsafe manufacturing
practices.2 When the Administration made its decisions, it followed
Commerce's recommendation that any long-range measures specifi-
cally address these principal problem area. 13
7. Id. at 522 (statement of Phillip H. Dutter).
8. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 1-27.
9. Id. at 1-26.
10. OPIONS PAPER ON PRODUCT LIBmrrIY AN AccDENT COMPENSATION ISSUES, 43 Fed.
Reg. 14,612 (1978).
11. Id. at 14,622-25.
12. Federal action focusing on unsafe manufacturing practices will not be discussed in
this Article.
13. See OPTIONS PAPER ON PRODUCT LIABILITY AND ACCIDENT COMPENSATION Is-
SUES-SYNTMESIS OF PUBLIC COMMENT, 43 Fed. Reg. 40,438 (1978).
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In the area of insurance ratemaking, the Administration asked
Commerce to explore how self-insurance could be facilitated. The
Administration reasoned that if product sellers were given a realistic
opportunity to insure themselves, commercial insurers, to stay com-
petitive, would set rates and premiums in accord with the very best
actuarial assessment of actual product risk. In response, Commerce
developed, and the Administration supported, the Risk Retention
Act (RRA).11 The RRA permits product sellers to form their own
self-insurance groups (with a federal charter); these groups will be
exempt from state insurance regulation. The RRA also exempts
product sellers from state "fictitious group" laws,15 thus allowing
small businesses to band together and bargain with commercial
insurers in order to obtain group rates. The Act has been approved
by the House of Representatives and is now before the Senate.'"
To address the problems of uncertainties in the tort system,
Commerce was asked to draft a Uniform Product Liability Act that
would serve as a model for the states. On January 12, 1979, Com-
merce's Draft Uniform Product Liability Law was published in the
Federal Register for public comment." Commerce received com-
ments on the draft totaling approximately 1500 pages and repre-
senting 240 separate communications. The Department also made
a special effort to bring the Draft Law to the attention of consumers.
Working with its Director of Consumer Affairs and the Office of the
Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs, Commerce
conducted consumer forums in Washington, D.C., Detroit, Los An-
geles, and Atlanta. In addition to meeting with consumer groups,
the drafters of the Uniform Act met with representatives of product
seller and insurer groups who expressed an interest in the proposal.
The Draft Law was also reviewed at hearings before the Subcommit-
tee on Oversight and Minority Enterprises of the House Committee
on Small Business, and before the Subcommittee on Consumer Pro-
tection and Finance of the House Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce. Interested government agencies also commented on
the Draft Law.
In preparing the initial drafts and final version" of the Act,
Commerce gave careful attention to existing state, congressional,
14. H.R. 6152, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CoNG. REc. 12,101; S. 1789, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess., 125 CONG. RFc. 13,187 (1979) [hereinafter cited as R.R.A.]. See also United States
Department of Commerce News, Aug. 16, 1978.
15. R.R.A., §§ 201-203.
16. 126 CONG. RHc. H1,683 (daily ed. March 10, 1980). The roll call vote was 332-17.
17. 44 Fed. Reg. 2996 (1979).
18. U.P.L.A., 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
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and private studies of product liability. Apart from legal literature
and case law, close attention was paid to the Product Liability
Closed Claims Survey conducted by the Insurance Services Office
in 1976-1977."9 This document provides an instant picture of over
23,000 product liability claims. The Department also reviewed all
major insurance proposals introduced in state legislatures in the
preceding two years. 0
In developing the Uniform Act, Commerce was guided in part
by six criteria:"
1. To insure that persons injured by unreasonably unsafe
products receive reasonable compensation for their injuries.
2. To insure the availability of affordable coverage to
product sellers whose manufacturing practices are reasonably
safe.
3. To place the incentive for loss prevention on the party
or parties who are best able to accomplish that goal.
4. To minimize the interval between the time of injury and
the time a claim is paid.
5. To minimize the sum of accident costs, prevention
costs, and transaction costs.
6. To use comparatively clear and precise language.
Some of these criteria naturally conflicted with others. While each
was considered in formulating the Uniform Act, the overriding
objective was to balance fairly the interests of all groups affected by
product liability. There is little doubt that the Uniform Act was
helped toward that goal by the detailed comment generated by the
first draft.
III. SoME HIGHLMGHTS OF THE UNIFORM ACr
A. The Uniform Act's Policy Foundations
Underlying the Uniform Act 2 is the recognition that product
liability law is a branch of the law of torts. The function of tort law
19. INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE PRODUCr LAitxry CLOSED CLAIMS SURVEY: A TECHNICAL
ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS (1977) [hereinafter cited as CLOSED CLAIMS SURVEY].
20. See U.P.L.A. app. A, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,750 (1979).
21. Id. at 62,714-15. See also FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at VII-2 to -9.
22. This Article will not describe the details of each section of the Uniform Act. Rather,
it will present an overview of some of the more important specifics of the Uniform Act.
Readers who desire more detail should consult the analyses accompanying each section of the
Uniform Act. These analyses show not only why the drafters chose a particular approach but
also why they declined suggested alternatives. Thus, in instances when the Department
departed from a particular approach advocated by a substantial segment of the public, the
reasons for doing so are explained.
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is to shift the cost of an accident from a claimant to a defendant
when the defendant is deemed "responsible" for the claimant's in-
juries. The drafters of the Uniform Act believe that this "respon-
sibility" should be defined in terms that everyone can under-
stand; rhetoric and catch phrases are poor substitutes for analysis
in the field of product liability. In the interests of clarity, there-
fore, those who write product liability law, whether they be judges,
legislators, or others, should take care to specify why a particular
product seller is sufficiently blameworthy that it should bear the
cost of that injury. As the introduction to the Uniform Act indicates,
"[tiort law is not a compensation system similar to Social Security
or Worker Compensation." Therefore, a product seller should not,
through the medium of tort law, be asked to pay damages merely
because its product caused an injury.
While almost all courts have agreed with that assumption,
some decisions have paid it only lip service in recent years. This is
unfortunate because it camouflages a basic public policy determina-
tion. It is the judgment of the drafters of the Uniform Act that if a
policy judgment is made that product sellers are to bear the costs
of all injuries caused by their products, it would be more efficient
to make purchasers third-party beneficiaries of product sellers' in-
surance policies. In an approach of that kind, an injured person's
damages would be limited. There would be only partial recovery of
loss of wages, and no recovery for pain and suffering.
In sum, the Uniform Act adopts a tort liability approach rather
than a compensatory approach to products claims. The plaintiff
may receive full tort damages, but in allowing full recovery, the
Uniform Act insists that there must be an articulation of why an
individual product seller was responsible.
B. Basic Standards of Responsibility
In section 104, the Uniform Act indicates that a product may
be proven defective in four basic ways:
1. It was unreasonably unsafe in construction;
2. It was unreasonably unsafe in design;
3. It was unreasonably unsafe because adequate warnings
or instructions were not provided; and
4. It was unreasonably unsafe because it did not conform
to a product seller's express warranty.
With respect to products that were defective in construction or
23. U.P.L.A., Introduction, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,715 (1979).
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that failed to conform to an express warranty, the Uniform Act
applies strict liability. The Final Report showed that strict liability
for defects in construction can be absorbed within the existing lia-
bility insurance system. 4 Construction defects are more predictable
than design defects or problems relating to failure to warn. Strict
liability for defects in construction is also consistent with section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and with implied war-
ranty law. These sources agree that consumers have a right to expect
products to be free from construction defects. A substantial amount
of public comment from consumers and product sellers on the Draft
Law supported this approach. Strict liability can also be justified
with respect to breach of an express warranty. If a product seller
makes a specific representation about its product, it is fair to hold
it to that promise.26 Moreover, the consumer has a right to expect
that a product will live up to the product seller's representation.
Strict liability cannot be justified, however, for either design
defects that are predicated on a failure to warn or instruct. Such
claims should be based on a practical fault standard. Some courts
have attempted to apply strict liability in these areas. They have
sought to justify the result under a theory of "risk distribution,"
wherein the product seller distributes the cost of all product re-
lated risks through liability insurance. The problem with this ap-
proach is that the "risk distribution" rationale provides no stopping
point short of absolute liability. Thus, a number of courts have
plunged into a foggy area that is neither strict liability nor negli-
gence. The courts state that they are not imposing "absolute" in-
surer liability but they have been unable to articulate why they
draw the line short of that pointY The result has been the creation
of a wide variety of legal formulae,2 unpredictability for consumers,
and instability in the insurance market.
A paradigm of a court's struggle to apply strict liability princi-
ples in a defective design case is Turner v. General Motors Corp.2'
24. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at VII-17.
25. Dean Wade, who participated in the drafting of Section 402A, has observed that
the Restatement authors were focusing on product liability cases dealing with mismanufac-
ture or defective construction, and not on cases dealing with defective design or duty to warn.
See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 830 (1973).
See also RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, App. (1965) (almost all cases cited dealt
with construction defects).
26. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 651-52 (4th ed. 1971) (decisions to the contrary have
been amazingly few).
27. See U.P.L.A. § 104, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,722 (1979).
28. See, e.g., Hagans v. Oliver Mach. Co., 576 F.2d 97, 99-100 (5th Cir. 1978); Dreison-
stock v. Volkswagenwerk, 489 F.2d 1066, 1071 (4th Cir. 1974).
29. Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
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In Turner, the plaintiff was injured when his car's roof caved in as
the car rolled over following an accident. The court held that strict
liability rules were applicable when the design defect was the cause
of plaintiff's injuries even though the defect was not the cause of the
accident. The case began in 1971 and it has taken over eight years,
with a number of Texas Supreme Court opinions," for the case to
be finally resolved.
The Uniform Act approaches a design case of this type by di-
recting the court and trier of fact to balance two pairs of factors. The
claimant must prove that, at the time of manufacture, the likeli-
hood that the product would cause claimant's harm or similar
harms, and the seriousness of those harms, outweighed both the
manufacturer's burden of producing a product with an alternative
design that would have prevented those harms and any adverse
effect that alternative design might have on the usefulness of the
product. Thus, the formula balances risk against utility and does
not rely on hindsight. The Uniform Act also identifies the type of
evidence that is relevant to this determination (for example, the
new or additional harms that might have resulted if the product
were designed differently).
With respect to products that are allegedly defective because
the product seller failed to provide an adequate warning or instruc-
tion with its product, the Uniform Act also adopts a fault standard.
Again, a formula is utilized. The claimant must prove that, at the
time of manufacture-(1) the likelihood that the product would
cause the claimant's harm or similar harms, and the seriousness of
those harms, rendered the manufacturer's instructions or warnings
inadequate; and (2) the manufacturer should and could have pro-
vided the instructions or warnings that the claimant alleges would
have been adequate. The Uniform Act then outlines some factors to
consider in making this determination (for example, the clarity and
conspicuousness of the warnings that were provided). The claimant
must also prove that the warnings it alleges would have been ade-
quate would also have been effective, either because, as a result of
the warning, a reasonably prudent product user would have de-
clined to use the product, or because he or she would have used it
in a manner so as to have avoided the harm.31 The Uniform Act
does not require product sellers to warn about obvious dangers. Re-
quiring such warnings would diminish the effectiveness of other
more important warnings. We should not reach the stage in our
law where the manufacturer of a safety pin must warn, "Do not
30. Id. See also Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974).
31. See Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1972).
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swallow when open.''3 The Uniform Act does, however, require that
the manufacturer act as a reasonably prudent product seller with
respect to warning product users about dangers discovered after the
product is sold. This is a particular problem in product liability law
today, and an appropriate rule of law has been provided to address
it.
These are the basic standards of responsibility for manufactur-
ers. The Uniform Act also provides liability standards for parties in
the distribution chain other than manufacturers, e.g., wholesalers,
retailers, and distributors." These parties are frequently brought
into liability suits even though there is no intent to impose the
ultimate damage awards on them. This process is expensive and
adds an unnecessary cost to products.34
The Uniform Act, therefore, generally limits the liability of
product sellers who are not manufacturers to instances in which
they themselves have been negligent. The focus of judicial inquiry
will be on the product seller's own conduct and whether the seller
failed to use reasonable care with respect to that product. The seller
is not liable for construction and design defects that an ordinary
prudent product seller would not discover, but it is expected to
convey warnings or instructions developed by the manufacturer for
the product user. It is also liable for breach of its own express war-
ranties.
In the unusual situation in which the manufacturer of the prod-
uct is out of business or not subject to judicial process, or when a
court determines that it is highly probable that the claimant would
be unable to enforce a judgment against the manufacturer, a non-
manufacturer product seller will be held to the standards of care
applicable to a manufacturer. In balancing the equities between the
consumer and the product seller, the drafters of the Uniform Act
judged that it was fair and reasonable to protect the consumer, since
the product seller sold the defective product.
In sum, the Uniform Act presents one unified cause of action
for injuries to persons and damage to property caused by products.
The Uniform Act supplants muddled theories of negligence, war-
ranty, and strict liability. It leaves recovery for product-related eco-
nomic harms to the Uniform Commercial Code.35
32. See generally Twerski, Weinstein, Donaker & Pichler, The Use and Abuse of Warn-
ings in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CoRNELL L. REV. 495
(1976).
33. U.P.L.A. § 105, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,726 (1979).
34. CLOSED CLIMs SuRVEY, supra note 19, at 90-94. See also Pender v. Skillcraft Indus.,
Inc., 358 So. 2d 45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
35. On the other hand, the Uniform Act explicitly preempts the U.C.C. and similar laws
in instances in which such laws have governed matters within the Act's coverage, i.e., actions
for personal injury, illness, death, or damage to property (other than to the product itself).
1980]
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C. Other Features of the Uniform Act
(1) State of the Art
There has been considerable debate in product liability law
as to the place of the "state of the art" in determining whether a
product is designed defectively or instructions for its use are in-
adequate. 3  The term has come to mean different things to
different parties; for that reason, the final version of the Uniform
Act does not use the term as a standard of liability. The Uniform
Act indicates that evidence of "custom" in a product seller's indus-
try, existing at the time of or prior to manufacture, is admissible,
but it is given no special evidentiary weight.17 On the other hand, if
a product seller proves that it was not within "practical technologi-
cal feasibility" 8 for it to make the product safer with respect to
design and warnings or instructions at the time of manufacture so
as to have prevented claimant's harm, the product seller will, in
general, not be liable for defects in design or failure to warn. There
are exceptions to this rule which are intended to protect consumer
rights. The product seller may be liable if it acted unreasonably in
selling the product at all,39 or if it violated an express warranty 0 or
failed to meet a post-manufacture duty to warn about the product.4
(2) Compliance with Standards
Another issue in product liability law that has wrought a good
deal of controversy concerns the relevance of compliance and non-
compliance with legislative or administrative standards. 2 The Uni-
form Act indicates that if the injury-causing aspect of a product was
36. Whereas product sellers argue that it is unfair to deem a product defective when it
is in compliance with the state of the art and industry custom is likely to incorporate all cost-
justified product safety features, consumer groups respond that it is inappropriate to allow
product sellers to fix indirectly their own standard of liability.
37. U.P.L.A. § 107(C), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,728-30 (1979).
38. By "practical technological feasibility," the Uniform Act means the technical, me-
chanical, and scientific knowledge relating to product safety that was reasonably feasible for
use in light of economic practicality at the time of manufacture. Id. § 107(D), 44 Fed. Reg.
at 62,728 (1979).
39. For example, a child's toy might comply with what was technologically feasible yet,
because of its danger, it would be unreasonable to market the product for young children.
40. See Crocker v. Winthrop Lab., 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974) (liability imposed when
product seller advertised that pharmaceutical was "free and safe from all dangers of addic-
tion" and claimant, because of an unforeseeable susceptibility, became physically depen-
dent).
41. See Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1970); Comstock v.
General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959).
42. Product sellers contend that since such standards are drafted by government ex-
perts after considerable study and public scrutiny, it is unfair to allow lay jurors to reevaluate
the standard. Consumers, on the other hand, argue that such standards represent compro-
mises which are at times unduly influenced by industry.
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in compliance with a legislative or administrative regulation relat-
ing to design or performance, the product shall not be deemed defec-
tive unless the claimant proves that a reasonably prudent product
seller would and could have taken additional precautions. Con-
versely, if the injury-causing aspect of the product was not in com-
pliance with such a standard, the product shall be deemed defective
unless the product seller proves that its failure to comply was a
reasonably prudent course of conduct under the circumstances.
(3) Product Life
Perhaps the most controversial area in product liability law
today concerns the length of time product sellers should be subject
to liability. 3 Under the Uniform Act, product sellers are not subject
to liability for harms that arise after the product's "useful safe life"
has expired." A product's "useful safe life" begins at the time of
delivery to a purchaser who is not engaged in the business of selling
the product and extends through the time in which it would
"normally be likely to perform or be stored in a safe manner." 5 In
a claim that involves a harm caused more than ten years after the
time of delivery to a purchaser who was not engaged in the business
of selling such products, a presumption arises that the product has
been used beyond its useful safe life. This presumption may be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. The presumption is
applicable in both workplace and non-workplace products-an im-
portant change from the first draft of the Uniform Act.
Nevertheless, to protect the consumer, the presumption will not
apply if-(1) the product seller expressly warrants that its product
can be used for a longer period; (2) the product seller intentionally
misrepresents or conceals information about a product; (3) the harm
was caused by prolonged exposure to a defective product;" or (4) the
injury-causing aspect of the product that existed at the time of
delivery was not discoverable by an ordinary reasonably prudent
person until ten years after that time.47 The Uniform Act also pro-
tects the consumer with its statute of limitations which runs two
43. Since most policies cover claims based on products manufactured or sold in the
past, insurers fear open-ended liability in the case of sellers of durable goods. In response to
this concern, some states have enacted statutes of repose that begin at the time a product is
first sold and distributed. The problem with these statutes, however, is that a person injured
by a product may lose his right to bring a claim even before his injury has actually occurred.
44. U.P.L.A. § 110(A)(1), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,732 (1979).
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div., 495 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1974).
47. See, e.g., Mickel v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969) (plastic used on
gear shift lost its resiliency when exposed to sunlight).
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years from the time the claimant discovered, or in the exercise of
due diligence should have discovered, the harm and its cause.
By reading the Uniform Act's materials on state of the art in
conjunction with those on product life, one can get an idea of the
Uniform Act's general philosophy. A manufacturer is generally not
liable for risks that it could not, as a reasonably prudent party,
discover or prevent." On the other hand, when a claimant would
have no reason to discover a harm and its cause, he or she will not
be barred from bringing an action.
(4) Comparative Fault
The Uniform Act makes full use of comparative responsibility
principles. Section 112 sets forth different types of conduct which
affect comparative fault. They are:
1. Failure to discover a defective condition-claimant is
under no duty to inspect, but is expected to discover a defect
that would be apparent to an ordinary person without inspec-
tion;
2. Use of a product with a known defective condi-
tion-generally, claimants may not create their own product
liability claims by using a product with a known defective condi-
tion, but there may be circumstances justifying such conduct
(for example, when a person discovers a welt in a tire, it may be
reasonable to proceed cautiously to a nearby service station
rather than to stop and immediately call for assistance);
3. Misuse of a product-damages are reduced to the ex-
tent that the misuse caused the harm;
4. Alteration or modification of a product-generally,
damages are reduced to the extent that product alteration or
modification, by someone other than the product seller, con-
tributed to or caused the harm.
The procedures for implementation of these principles are contained
in section 111 of the Uniform Act.
Perhaps the most important application of these principles re-
lates to misuse or modification of products.49 When a product seller
proves that product misuse contributed to a claimant's harm, dam-
ages are subject to reduction or apportionment to the extent that
the misuse was a cause of the harm. "Misuse" occurs when a prod-
uct is used in a manner that a reasonably prudent manufacturer
48. An important exception to this is the manufacturer's liability for construction de-
fects. See U.P.L.A. § 104(A), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721 (1979).
49. Id. §§ 112(C), (D), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,737 (1979).
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would not foresee. It seems inappropriate to burden those who use
products correctly with insurance costs that arise not from product
defects but from product misuse.
The Uniform Act takes the same general approach with respect
to alteration or modification of products. 0 An "alteration or modifi-
cation" occurs when a party other than the product seller changes
the design, construction, or formula of the product, or removes or
changes warnings or instructions that accompanied or were dis-
played on the product. When a product seller proves that an altera-
tion or modification of the product caused the claimant's harm,
damages shall be subject to reduction to the extent that the altera-
tion or modification was a cause of the harm. The defense does not
apply if the product seller authorized or consented to the alterations
or modifications, or if the product seller would have expected a
reasonably prudent person to make such alterations or modifica-
tions in the same or similar circumstances.
(5) Workers' Compensation
Perhaps one of the thorniest areas of product liability law con-
cerns the relationship between product liability and worker com-
pensation. The Uniform Act follows the approach that was devel-
oped by the American Insurance Association and recommended in
Congressman LaFalce's Subcommittee on Capital, Investment, and
Business Opportunities." First, neither the employer nor its worker
compensation carrier has a right of subrogation against the product
seller when its product has caused an injury to an employee. Sec-
ond, a damage award rendered against a product seller is reduced
by the amount of worker compensation benefits paid for the same
injury. Third, the employer's worker compensation benefits shield
is preserved. This approach keeps worker compensation and prod-
uct liability independent and reduces the cost of shifting damages
50. Id.
51. Id. § 114, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,740 (1979). The need for change arises from the fact
that under the current law of a number of jurisdictions, the interaction of product liability
and worker compensation law results in the manufacturer of a workplace product paying the
entire cost of a product related workplace injury because he is unable to place a portion of
that cost on an employer whose negligence may have contributed to the injury. This reduces
the employer's incentive to keep workplace products safe. There are problems with other
alternatives as well. If, for example, a full contribution claim is permitted in all cases in which
the employer is at fault, the employer may be forced to pay an amount in excess of his or her
statutory worker compensation liability, thereby thwarting the central concept behind that
compensation system. On the other hand, if contribution is not permitted, a manufacturer
may be forced to pay the full amount of the judgment despite the possibly greater responsibil-
ity of the employer.
1980]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
from one system to another.5 This, in turn, will help stabilize insur-
ance rates and premiums. Nevertheless, the approach protects the
rights of injured employees, who recover the same amount as they
would under the present system. Finally, the approach should en-
courage employers to keep workplace products in a safe condition,
since subrogation is not permitted.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are many important aspects of the Uniform Act that
have not been discussed herein including provisions on assumption
of risk,53 punitive damages," and contribution among joint tortfea-
sors.15 Nevertheless, the examples that have been given show that
it is a law that attempts to balance the interests of product users
and sellers. It is the Department's hope that state legislatures will
give it serious consideration and that it will help bring about uni-
formity in the key areas of product liability law. As long as courts
can retroactively create new and unprecedented product liability
law, the specter of future product liability crises will continue. Sta-
tutory uniformity in key areas of product liability law can stabilize
product liability insurance ratemaking and serve as a bulwark
against such crises.
In conclusion, it is the Department's view that the Uniform
Product Liability Act will help stabilize product liability rates and
premiums. The Risk Retention Act will help assure that commercial
insurance rates, now and in the future, are set on a truly competitive
basis. It is clear that the Uniform Product Liability Act and the Risk
Retention Act are synergistic; each will help make the other more
effective. The remedies can end the product liability problem for
product sellers without compromising consumer rights.
52. Transaction costs areof a substantial importanqe in product liability. See CLOsED
CLAMS SURvEY, supra note 19, at 90-94.
53. U.P.L.A. § 110, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,748 (1979).
54. Id. § 120, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,748 (197Q).
55. Id. § 111(B), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,734 (1979).
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